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However, although the study of the mind can greatly benefit 
from an embodied conception of the mind, it still has to free itself 
from another tradition of Western culture which constitutes an 
obstacle to a complete understanding of the mind: the mind tends 
to be identified with cognition, that is, with knowing, reasoning, 
deciding, and acting. But cognition is only half of the mind. The 
other half of the mind is its emotional half and, although the two 
halves of the mind continuously interact and behavior is a result of 
both halves, no satisfactory account of the mind can be provided 
if the science of the mind is only “cognitive” science. Today one 
speaks of “embodied cognition,” “grounded cognition,” and the 
mental representation of objects in terms of the actions with which 
organisms respond to them. But organisms, including humans, do 
not only have knowledge, goals, and the capacity to act. They also 
have motivations and emotional states which play a crucial role 
in their behavior. Current embodied views of the mind tend to be 
concerned with the cognitive half of the mind but an embodied 
account of the mind must be extended to the other half of the 
mind, its emotional half and, in fact, some psychologists and neu-
roscientists are trying to extend the embodied conception of the 
mind to emotions (see, for example, Gallese, 2008; Freina et al., 
2009; Glenberg et al., 2009).
Even if one assumes that the mind generally does not contain 
anything which is unrelated to sensory input and motor output 
(which is what embodied theories assume), the cognitive and the 
emotional halves of the mind may not function in the same way. 
Input to the brain can be input from the environment but also 
input from inside the body, and output from the brain can be 
external motor output but also changes in the internal organs and 
systems of the body, and these different sensory inputs and motor 
outputs may have different characteristics and consequences. This 
is why we need models that capture both the cognitive half and the 
emotional half of the mind and their interactions. These models 
should explicitly indicate both similarities and differences between 
embodied cognition and embodied emotion.
IntroductIon
In the Western cultural tradition the mind tends to be viewed as 
separated from the body and, in accordance with this tradition, 
the sciences of the mind try to understand the mind with no 
reference to the body. In the last few decades, however, this has 
changed. The cumulative and fast advances of the sciences of the 
body (neurosciences, evolutionary biology, genetics, the biological 
sciences more generally) make all attempts at studying the mind 
while ignoring the body less and less plausible. In fact, the idea 
that the mind is embodied and that to understand the mind it is 
necessary to take the body into consideration is being accepted by 
an increasing number of researchers and constitutes the premise 
of many important current investigations (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; 
Robbins and Aydede, 2009). The embodied view of the mind has 
led to a recognition of the importance of the actions with which 
the organism responds to the stimuli in determining how the 
world is represented in the organism’s mind, in contrast to the 
traditional emphasis on mental representations as either entirely 
abstract or derived only from sensory input. This action-based 
view of the mind underlies a number of important ideas such 
as the grounding of symbols in the interactions of the organism 
with the physical environment (Harnad, 1990), the mental (neu-
ral) “simulation” of actions as a crucial component of all sorts 
of understanding (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004), the mental representation of objects in terms not of their 
sensory properties but of the actions that the objects make pos-
sible (affordances; Gibson, 1977), the action-based nature of cat-
egories (Borghi et al., 2002; Di Ferdinando and Parisi, 2004). The 
embodied view of the mind is also reflected in computational 
models which reproduce the part of the body more directly linked 
to the mind, i.e., the brain (artificial neural networks) and, more 
recently, the entire body of the organism (robotics), and which 
have abandoned the disembodied view of the mind which is at 
the basis of artificial intelligence and of conceptions of the mind 
as symbol manipulation.
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having a body. Furthermore, since the brain is part of the body, to 
be consistent robots should be neuro-robots, that is, robots whose 
behavior is controlled by a system that resembles the structure 
and functioning of the brain, i.e., an artificial neural network. This 
has the advantage that it becomes possible to examine the internal 
representations contained in the robot’s “brain” (the patterns of 
activation and successions of patterns of activation in the robot’s 
neural network) and to determine if they are embodied or non-
embodied representations, i.e., if they reflect the robot’s actions 
and the reactions of the robot’s internal organs and systems to 
sensory input rather than the sensory input. (This is more difficult 
to do with “emotional” robots which are not controlled by neural 
networks but by symbolic systems such as those of Breazeal and 
Brooks, 2005.)
What we will do in this paper is describe a number of simple 
robots that may help us to construct an entire theory of mind as 
made up of a cognitive half and an emotional half.
the strategIc and the tactIcal level of functIonIng 
of organIsms
The first step toward the construction of robots which have both a 
cognitive and an emotional mind is to construct robots that have 
many different motivations which cannot all be satisfied at the 
same time and therefore the robots have to decide at any given time 
which motivation to pursue with their behavior. Current robots 
tend to have only one motivation. In some cases their behavior 
is complex: for example, they may approach an object with their 
legs or wheels, reach the object with their arm, grasp the object 
with their hand, and put the object in their mouth. But behind 
this behavior there is a single motivation, say, the motivation to 
eat. In contrast, a robot’s behavior may be very simple but the 
robot has many independent motivations. An example is a robot 
that has both a motivation to eat and a motivation to drink. The 
behavior which is needed to satisfy the motivation to eat or the 
motivation to drink may be very simple but the robot has to decide 
which motivation to satisfy if the two motivations cannot be both 
satisfied at the same time. Some current robots do have more than 
one motivation but it is their user which decides which motivation 
should control their behavior at any given time, i.e., what they 
must do, and in this sense current robots are not really autono-
mous. (For attempts at constructing robots that are motivationally 
autonomous or that take motivational decisions, cf. Brooks, 1986; 
Maes, 1990, although the last two references are to symbolically 
controlled robots. The difference between neural network and 
rule-based approaches to motivations and motivational decisions 
is discussed in Seth, 1998, 2007.)
Real organisms are different. They have many different and 
largely independent motivations and one of the most important 
aspects of their behavior is that they have to autonomously decide 
which motivation to pursue at any given time. In fact, the behavior 
of real organisms has two levels of functioning, the strategic or 
motivational level and the tactical or cognitive level (Ruini et al., 
2010). At the strategic level the organism has to decide which one 
of its many different motivations will control its behavior at any 
particular time. At the tactical level, the organism has to execute 
the behavior which is appropriate to satisfy the motivation which 
has been decided at the strategic level. Imagine an organism which 
This also applies to the study of the mind through the con-
struction of computational models or robots. Robots are the most 
appropriate tools for exploring embodied theories of the mind 
because, although in a very simplified form, they reproduce the 
body of organisms and the physical organ that controls the organ-
isms’ behavior (neuro-robots), and this is true for both physically 
realized robots and for robots which are simulated in a computer. 
However, current robots mostly try to reproduce the cognitive half 
of the mind but they ignore its emotional half. The robots displace 
themselves in the environment, move their arms and reach for 
objects, turn their eyes and their face, but they do not have emo-
tions. Some current robots produce postures and movements of 
their bodies (mostly, the face) that in humans express emotions and 
they can recognize the expressed emotions of humans as a purely 
perceptual task, but they cannot be said to really have emotions and 
to really understand the emotions of others (Picard, 2000, 2003; 
Breazeal, 2002; Adolphs, 2005; Canamero, 2005; Dautenhahn et al., 
2009; Robinson and el Kaliouby, 2009; cf. Arbib and Fellous, 2004; 
Fellous and Arbib, 2005). (For an attempt at understanding the 
functional role of emotions in behavior, see Ziemke, 2008.). The 
reason is quite simple. The cognitive half of the mind is the result 
of the interactions of the brain with the external environment or of 
processes self-generated inside the organism’s brain (mental life). 
Current robots have artificial brains which interact with the external 
environment and, in some cases, can even self-generate inputs and 
respond to these self-generated inputs (Mirolli and Parisi, 2006, 
2009; Parisi, 2007). But current robotics is an external robotics: 
robots reproduce the external morphology of an organism’s body, 
the organism’s sensory and motor organs, and the interactions of 
the organism’s brain with the external environment. In contrast, the 
emotional half of the mind is the result of the interactions of the 
organism’s brain with the organism’s body and with the organs and 
systems that are inside the body. If we want to construct robots that 
can be said to really have emotions, what is needed is an internal 
robotics, that is, robots that have internal organs and systems with 
which the robot’s brain can interact (Parisi, 2004). Only an internal 
robotics can help us to better understand the emotional half of the 
mind and to construct a complete embodied theory of the mind.
Computational models and, more specifically, robotic models 
are important to understand the mind. Theories in psychology 
tend to be expressed verbally but verbally expressed theories have 
limitations because words often have different meanings for differ-
ent people and because verbally expressed theories may be unable 
to generate specific, detailed, and non-controversial predictions. 
Robots are an alternative way of expressing theories. The theory 
is used to construct a robot and therefore, in a sense, it can be 
directly observed and it can contain no ambiguity because oth-
erwise the robot cannot be constructed. Furthermore, the theory 
generates many specific, detailed, and uncontroversial predictions 
which are the behaviors exhibited by the robot. These predictions 
can be empirically validated by comparing them with all sorts of 
empirical facts: the results of behavioral experiments, data on the 
ecology and past evolutionary history of the organism, and data 
on the organism’s body and brain.
As we have said, robotic models are especially appropriate for 
formulating embodied theories of the mind because, by definition, 
a robot has a body and the robot’s behavior clearly depends on its 
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and it must take these decisions at the appropriate time, which 
in many cases means quickly. This is where emotions come in. 
Emotions are states of the organism’s body that allow the motiva-
tional decision mechanism to function more effectively and more 
efficiently. Emotional states influence the current intensity of the 
organism’s motivations in such a way that the organism functions 
better at the strategic level. The sight of a potential mate might cause 
an emotional state in the organism that increases the probability 
that the organism will pursue the motivation to mate rather than 
other motivations. The sight of a present danger may induce an 
emotional state that increases the probability that the organism will 
stop pursuing other motivations and try to avoid the danger, and 
will do this fast. In more complex organisms such as humans, even 
the thought of a mate or of a danger may increase the importance 
of the motivation to mate or the motivation to avoid the danger, 
with the consequence that the organism will be less likely to pursue 
other motivations.
In the next section we describe some simple robots that have to 
decide among different motivations and we show that if the robots 
have emotions their motivational decisions are more correct and 
efficient.
robots that have emotIons
We have constructed a robot which lives in an environment con-
taining both food and a predator (Parisi and Petrosino, 2010; Ruini 
et al., 2010). To remain alive the robot has both to eat the food and 
to avoid being killed by the predator. The predator is not always 
present but when it appears the robot has to cease looking for food 
and escape from the predator. The neural network controlling the 
robot’s behavior has sensory input units encoding the presence and 
location of both food and predator, motor output units encoding 
the movements that allow the robot to displace itself in the envi-
ronment, and an intermediate layer of internal units. To eat the 
robot has to approach and reach the food elements while to avoid 
being killed by the predator the robot has to avoid physical contact 
with the predator. The connection weights of the robot’s neural 
network are developed using a genetic algorithm with a popula-
tion of robots that reproduce selectively and with the constant 
addition of random variations to the inherited connection weights 
(Mitchell, 1998). The robots are simulated Khepera robots (Nolfi 
and Gigliotta, 2010). They have a circular body with two wheels 
allowing the robot to displace itself in the environment and sensory 
organs allowing the robot to perceive what is in front of the robot 
within a given distance from the robot.
We compare two populations of robots. In one population 
the robots’ neural network has the architecture we have already 
described. In the other population we add to the robot’s neural 
network an “emotional circuit” made up of a certain number of 
units which receive activation from the sensory units encoding 
the presence of the predator and send their activation to either the 
internal units or the output units and therefore influence the robot’s 
behavior. These emotional units have special properties compared 
to the other internal units of the robots’ neural network. They have 
no “bias,” they have an activation threshold, and an emotional unit 
is not only active in the particular cycle in which activation arrives 
to the emotional unit from the input units but its activation may 
persist in subsequent cycles. The unit’s activation threshold and 
lives in an environment containing both food and water and which 
to survive has to both eat and drink. Food and water are located 
in different places in the environment so that, at any given time, 
the organism has to decide whether to approach and reach food, 
and satisfy its motivation to eat, or to approach and reach water, 
and satisfy its motivation to drink. Once one of the two different 
motivations has been chosen at the strategic level, the tactical level 
of functioning of the organism generates the appropriate behavior 
which allows the organism to satisfy the motivation.
How is the decision taken at the strategic level? We assume that 
the decision is based on a simple mechanism. At any given time 
each motivation has an intensity which may vary from time to 
time, and the organism decides to pursue the motivation which 
currently has the highest intensity. We use the verb “to decide” 
but what we are talking about is implicitly expressed motivations 
and a purely physical mechanism that compares different motiva-
tional intensities, although in complex and verbal animals such as 
humans, the decision mechanism may involve talking to oneself, 
making explicit predictions, and producing explicit evaluations. 
The intensity of the different motivations is determined by two 
classes of factors: (1) the intrinsic intensity of the different moti-
vations, which may depend on the overall adaptive pattern of the 
organism (e.g., the organism’s body needs more food than water) 
or on the properties of the organism’s environment (e.g., food is 
less abundant than water in the organism’s environment), and (2) 
the current stimuli arriving to the organism’s sensors from the 
external environment (e.g., the organism presently sees food rather 
than water) or from the organism’s own body [e.g., the current 
level of nutrients (hunger) is lower than the current level of water 
(thirst)] or, in more complex animals such as humans, the stimuli 
which are self-generated (predicted, imagined, remembered) in 
the organism’s brain. Once one motivation has been chosen at the 
strategic level, the organism produces the behavior that satisfies, or 
should satisfy, the motivation. Notice that since the intensity of the 
different motivations can change very rapidly because of the arrival 
of new stimuli and for other reasons, the organism should be able 
to shift very quickly from pursuing one motivation to pursuing 
another motivation, and this may happen even if the first motiva-
tion has not been satisfied or entirely satisfied.
That organisms function at two levels, the motivational and the 
cognitive level, is indicated by the fact that an individual may be 
good at the motivational level but not very good at the cognitive level 
while the opposite may be true for another individual. An individual 
may be good at choosing to satisfy its hunger rather than its thirst 
because its body needs energy rather than water but then it may not 
be very good at finding food. In contrast, another individual may be 
very good at finding both food and water but it makes the wrong 
motivational decisions, or is slow at deciding or, even more criti-
cally, is unable to decide and does nothing. Notice that to stay alive 
and possibly reproduce an individual should be sufficiently good at 
both levels since both being unable to decide correctly and rapidly 
and being unable to do what is necessary to satisfy the motivation 
decided at the motivational level may reduce the organism’s chances 
of surviving and reproducing or the organism’s well-being.
This indicates that a crucial component of behavior is that the 
organism’s motivational decision mechanism must function effec-
tively and efficiently. It must take the correct motivational decisions 
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emotIons and socIalIty
The robots we have described in the preceding section do not have 
sociality. They live alone in their environment, and predators, mates, 
and offspring are not robots themselves but are only objects which 
are present in the environment and are perceived by the robots. 
Many animals, and especially humans, are social, which means 
that they live with conspecifics and a large portion of their adap-
tive pattern consists in being able to interact appropriately with 
conspecifics. What is the relation of emotions to sociality?
Emotions and sociality are linked in two distinct ways. Many 
motivations in social animals can be satisfied only with the par-
ticipations of conspecifics, i.e., they are social motivations. For 
example, in species that reproduce sexually, an individual cannot 
satisfy its motivation to have offspring without the participa-
tion of an individual of the opposite sex. Since emotional states 
help the strategic level of functioning of the organism to take 
better motivational decisions, social animals tend to have social 
emotional states that allow them to take better motivational 
decisions when these decisions concern social motivations. The 
other way in which emotions and sociality are related is that 
emotional states are associated with postures and movements of 
the organism’s body which can be perceived by other individuals 
and therefore can inform these individuals about the emotional 
states of the organism.
Examples of social motivations are the motivation to mate with 
another individual, the motivation to take care of one’s offspring, 
and the motivation to be helped or to avoid being damaged by 
another individual. All these motivations enter into the motiva-
tional decisions of the organism which has to decide which motiva-
tion to pursue at any given time. Hence, social organisms tend to 
have social emotional states which regulate the current intensity 
of their social motivations and positively influence their motiva-
tional decisions that have to take into account social motivations.
It may not be too difficult to construct robots that have social 
emotions. In some recently completed simulations, the robots can 
be either female or male and to reproduce a robot has to mate with 
a robot of the opposite sex. The robots live in an environment 
with both food and other robots of the two sexes and to leave 
their genes to the next generation they have both to eat to remain 
alive and to approach and reach a robot of the opposite sex to 
reproduce. Female and male robots have different colors so that 
they can be recognized as females or males by conspecifics. But 
there is a further complication. After reproductively mating with a 
male robot, a female robot cannot reproduce for a certain number 
of time steps and during this non-reproductive period the female 
robot changes its color and this change of color is perceived by the 
other robots. A pregnant female knows its current state because 
its neural network has internal input units encoding the pregnant 
state of its body. The results show that while the average number 
of offspring is necessarily identical for females and males, males 
have more reproductive variability than females, that is, there are 
males with many offspring and males with very few or no offspring 
while females all have more or less the same number of offspring. 
Furthermore, the robots alternate appropriately between looking 
for food and looking for mates, with reproductive females behaving 
differently toward males compared to non-reproductive females, 
and males approaching only reproductive females.
the parameters that control how the activation of a unit persists 
in subsequent cycles all have evolved values. (For a more detailed 
description of the emotional circuit and of the results of the simula-
tions, see Parisi and Petrosino, 2010.)
The results of the simulations show that the robots with the 
emotional circuit reach higher level of performance (they live 
longer) than the robots which do not have the emotional circuit 
in their brain. If we look at the robots’ behavior, we see that they 
immediately cease looking for food and fly away when the preda-
tor appears, thereby reducing the probability of being reached 
and killed by the predator. The robots without the emotional 
circuit are less fast at shifting from the motivation to eat to the 
motivation to avoid being killed by the predator, and this leads 
to shorter lives.
In other simulations the robots have to make other motivational 
decisions: they have to decide whether to eat or drink, whether to 
eat or look for a mate, whether to eat or take care of their offspring, 
or whether to eat or rest when their body incurs some physical 
damage that can be healed by resting. The neural network of the 
robots has sensory units, motor units, and an intermediate layer of 
internal units and, in addition, it has internal inputs units encoding 
the current level of energy inside their body (hunger sensors) and, 
for the robots that have to both eat and drink, also internal input 
units encoding the level of water (thirst sensors), while the robots 
which can incur physical damage have internal input units encoding 
the presence of physical damage (pain sensors).
All these robots have to take motivational decisions, and their 
“fitness” depends on both their ability to take the appropriate 
motivational decisions with the required rapidity and their ability 
to produce the behavior which satisfies the motivation which has 
been chosen. The results of the simulations indicate that for all 
robots the possession of an emotional circuit allows them to take 
better and more rapid motivational decisions so that their fitness is 
higher than the fitness of the robots lacking the emotional circuit.
The robots we have described respond to the input from the 
external environment and/or from within their body not only with 
actions but also with emotional states, i.e., states of their emotional 
circuit, that make their motivational decisions more effective and 
efficient and therefore their behavior more “fit.” The emotional 
circuit of these robots is very simple. The emotional units receive 
activation from the external environment (e.g., the sight of a preda-
tor) and/or from inside the body (e.g., the current level of energy 
in the robot’s body) and they send their activation to the internal 
units or to the motor units of the robot’s neural network, thereby 
influencing the robot’s behavior. Real organisms are more complex. 
The equivalents of our robots’ emotional units send their activa-
tion to various internal organs and systems such as the heart, the 
gut, the hormonal system, to the muscles of the face, and to other 
parts of the body, and receive activation from all these parts of 
the body, and it is this activation which influences the organism’s 
motivational decisions and therefore the organism’s behavior. In 
fact, as originally proposed by James and Lange (1922), and recently 
elaborated by Damasio (1994, 2004) and LeDoux (1996, 2000), 
felt emotional states are largely the product of these interactions. 
However, although very simple, our robots can be said to have 
emotions and to implement an embodied theory of the other half 
of the mind.
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by conspecifics in that many of the motivations of an individual 
can only be satisfied with the participation of other individuals. 
Therefore, for a social individual it is important to be able to pre-
dict the behavior of other individuals, and knowing the emotional 
states of other individuals is a powerful predictor of their behavior. 
This may explain why social animals (of some complexity) tend to 
attend to and to be able to understand the emotional states of other 
individuals as these emotional states are expressed by the postures 
and movements of certain parts of their body. But why should an 
individual care to express its emotional states through the postures 
and movements of its body so that another individual can know 
them? The explanation in this case is not in terms of predictability 
but in terms of manipulation, where manipulation is behaving in 
such a way that the other individual will behave in some desired 
manner. In other words, an individual will express its emotional 
states because this will induce another individual which is informed 
of such emotional states to behave in ways which are desirable for 
the first individual.
Both functions of the expression of emotional states can be 
simulated with robots possessing an emotional circuit which inter-
acts with the robot’s body so that specific states of the circuit will 
cause specific postures and movements in the robot’s body which 
can be perceived by other robots. This will allow the first robot to 
let its emotional state be known by other robots and therefore to 
influence their behavior and will allow the other robots to predict 
the behavior of the first robot.
Being able to predict X is an important component of (or per-
haps the same thing as) understanding X. What is for individual 
A to understand individual B? The embodied theory of sociality 
says that A understands B by “simulating” B’s perceived actions 
in its own brain (Gallese, 2010). But the behavior of B does not 
only consist in doing actions but also in expressing emotions, and 
sociality implies understanding not only B’s actions but also B’s 
expressed emotions. Hence, a more complete theory of sociality 
proposes that A understands B not only by observing B’s actions 
and “simulating” these actions in its own brain but also by observ-
ing B’s expressed emotions and “simulating” these emotions in its 
own brain–body. (Remember that, while the cognitive half of the 
mind is a product of the brain, the emotional half is a product of 
the interaction between the brain and the body.) There is an accu-
mulating experimental literature on the role of expressed emotions 
in sociality. For example, Bayliss et al. (2007) have shown that how 
objects are affectively evaluated by an individual is influenced by 
the gaze and emotional expression of another individual, and Ferri 
et al. (2010) that the emotional expression of another individual 
may affect the goal-directed behavior of the observer. These are 
among the experimental results which our robots that have emo-
tions should be able to replicate.
emotIons and language
An extension of the embodied view of mind to language proposes, 
and tries to show with experiments, that we understand nouns 
by internally representing in our brain the action with which we 
respond to the object designated by the noun and we understand 
verbs by “simulating” in our brain the action designated by the verb 
(Fischer and Zwaan, 2008). However, if the mind has two halves, 
the cognitive and the emotional half, an embodied conception of 
The next step is to add an emotional circuit to the neural network 
of these robots and to see if in this case too the possession of the 
emotional circuit leads to better performance. What would make 
the states of this circuit social emotional states is that, unlike the 
emotional states of the robots described in the preceding Section, 
the emotional states of these robots would be activated by the sight 
of a conspecific and they would allow a robot to take better moti-
vational decisions about what to do socially.
This leads us to the second aspect that links emotions to sociality. 
The emotional states of the robots we have just described are social 
only in the sense that they are associated with social motivations 
but they are not social in the sense that they are expressed, that is, 
they are communicated to other individuals. What appears to be 
really important to understand the role of emotions in sociality is 
to construct robots that express their emotional states and in this 
manner cause other individuals to know their emotional states and 
to be influenced in their behavior by this knowledge.
How can we construct robots that express emotions they really 
have? As we have said, current “emotional” robots express emotions 
that they do not have, that is, that do not play any functional role 
in their behavior. To construct robots that express emotional states 
which they really have it is necessary to link the emotional circuit of 
the robots we have described in the preceding section to postures 
and movements of the robot’s body that can be perceived by other 
robots. In the robots described in the preceding section, the emo-
tional circuit influences the manner in which the robot responds 
to both external and internal inputs but it has no interactions with 
the rest of the robot’s body. As we have said, this is not so in real 
organisms, in which the emotional circuit of the brain sends its 
activation to other parts of the body and these parts of the body 
respond by sending activation to the brain. As we have also said, 
some of the parts of the body activated by the emotional circuit are 
external and therefore their state or change of state (postures and 
movements) can be perceived by another individual. In this way 
an individual may know the emotional states of another individual 
by observing the postures and movements of the body of the other 
individual that result from the activations sent to the body by its 
emotional units.
Why should the emotional states of an individual be reflected 
(expressed) in the postures and movements of the individual’s 
body and therefore be accessible to the sensors of another indi-
vidual? Why should the other individual be able to understand 
the emotional states of the individual by perceiving the postures 
and movements of its body? Postures and movements of the body 
may be simply a by-product of having emotional states, with no 
specific adaptive value. But the richness of the expression of emo-
tions in some animals, and especially humans, seems to indicate 
that expressing one’s emotions has adaptive value and has evolved 
for this reason. This adaptive value is informing other individuals 
of one’s emotional states. The adaptive value appears to consist in 
two things: predictability and manipulation. For the other indi-
vidual it may have adaptive value to know the emotional states 
of the first individual by perceiving the postures and movements 
of its body. Adapting to the environment is to a large extent to be 
able to predict the future state of the environment given its present 
state in order to prepare for the future state. For social animals an 
important component of their adaptive environment is constituted 
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A crucial assumption of the model we have described is that 
there is no entity in the robot’s neural network which can be called 
the meaning of a word. If we assume that the internal units of 
NoL have internal connections linking the units of the same layer, 
when an activation pattern is evoked in the internal units of NoL, 
this activation pattern will evoke a second activation pattern in 
the same or other units, then a third, and so on, so that the initial 
activation pattern is only the first step of a process which has no 
natural end and no fixed boundaries and is influenced by a number 
of factors such as the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which 
the word is being experienced by the robot, inter-individual dif-
ferences among the robots, the frequency with which a word has 
been experienced by the robot, and others. Notice that the internal 
layer of NoL is not a specialized “semantic module” but is the entire 
brain (minus the L sub-network). This implies that the spreading 
of activation in NoL can invade the emotional circuit of the robot’s 
neural network and in this manner it can trigger emotional states 
in the robot. These emotional states triggered by words constitute 
the emotional meaning of words. Words have emotional meaning 
if a word co-varies in the robot’s experience with non-linguistic 
experiences that cause emotional states in the robot.
This of course is only a first step toward a robotic account of the 
emotional meaning of words. Here is a list of interesting questions 
that this account should be able to answer. Why, while all words have 
a cognitive meaning, only some words appear to have an emotional 
meaning? Why the cognitive meaning of words appears to be more 
well-defined, articulated, and specific than their emotional meaning? 
How can we capture this fact with our robots? Words often appear 
to have emotional meaning not in isolation but in the context of 
other words, i.e., in sentences (Havas et al., 2007). Why this is so? In 
some experiments it has been shown that abstract words tend have 
more emotional meaning than concrete words (Kousta et al., 2009a). 
Why? Other experiments indicate that emotional words are processed 
more rapidly than non-emotional words (Kousta et al., 2009b). Why?
summary
Theories expressed as robots have two important advantages 
compared to verbally expressed theories: they are unambiguous 
because they refer to things that can observed and measured and 
they generate many detailed and non-controversial empirical pre-
dictions, which are the behaviors of the robot and what happens 
in the robot’s “brain.” We have described some robotic models that 
begin to address the question of how to develop a theory of mind 
that takes into consideration both the cognitive and the emotional 
halves of the mind. We have shown that if we add an emotional 
circuit to the neural network that controls a robot’s behavior, the 
robot’s behavior becomes more effective because the emotional 
circuit allows the robot to take more correct and faster motivational 
decisions. Unlike current “emotional” robots, robots that possess 
this circuit can be said to actually have emotions in that one can 
show that the circuit plays a clear functional role in the robot’s 
behavior. We have then addressed the question of how emotions 
are related to sociality and we have distinguished two aspects of 
this relation. Robots can have social motivations, that is, motiva-
tions that can only satisfied with the participation of conspecifics, 
and emotions can be said to be social if they cause the robot to 
make better motivational decisions when the choice set includes 
language should give an account of both the cognitive and emo-
tional meanings of words. What we do in this section is describe 
some simple robots that (begin to) have language, and to suggest 
how words can evoke in these robots not only a cognitive meaning 
but also an emotional meaning.
Most words are sounds, or phono-articulatory movements 
that produce acoustic sounds, which co-vary with specific objects 
(nouns) or actions (verbs). If objects and actions evoke emotional 
states, words will also evoke emotional states. The “cognitive” ori-
entation of most current theories of the mind can also be seen in 
the privilege accorded to the “cognitive” component of the mean-
ings of words rather than to their “emotional” component, where 
the cognitive component refers to the perceptual properties of the 
object designed by a noun or to the action designed by a verb while 
the emotional component refers to the emotional states evoked by 
the noun or verb. But if we want to construct robots that can be said 
to have language, it will be necessary that their words evoke emo-
tional states, not only “cognitive meanings,” in other robots. This 
requires an appropriate robotic model of the meanings of words. 
We will now briefly describe such a model. (For a more detailed 
description of the model, see Parisi, 2010. For robotic models of 
nouns and verbs, see Cangelosi and Parisi, 2001.)
Our robots live in an environment with other robots and 
their neural network is made up of two sub-networks, the non-
linguistic sub-network (NoL) and the linguistic sub-network (L). 
NoL is made of input units encoding non-linguistic sensory input 
(perceived objects and perceived actions of another robot) and 
output units encoding non-linguistic actions (e.g., reaching and 
grasping an object). L has input units encoding linguistic sounds 
(produced by another robot) and output units encoding phono-
articulatory movements that produce linguistic sounds. Both NoL 
and L have a layer of internal units which connects the input units 
to the output units. In addition, the two internal layers also have 
horizontal connections linking the internal units of NoL to those 
of L, and vice versa. Given these horizontal connections, perceiving 
an object can lead to executing a non-linguistic action but also to 
executing a phono-articulatory action, i.e., producing the word 
which designates the object. And hearing a word may lead to repro-
ducing the word by executing the appropriate movements of one’s 
phono-articulatory organs (imitating the sound of the word) or to 
executing a non-linguistic action. When the robot learns language 
(which, in children, begins at 1 year of age), the robots learns the 
appropriate connection weights for these horizontal connections. 
What is the role of these connection weights? In the robot’s social 
experience one specific linguistic sound tends to co-vary with one 
specific object or action, and vice versa. The robot incorporates 
these co-variations in the connection weights of its neural network 
so that when the robot hears a linguistic sound and activation 
spreads from the internal layer of L to the internal layer of NoL, the 
pattern of activation evoked in the internal units of NoL is more 
or less the same pattern of activation evoked by perceiving the 
object or action which co-varies with the linguistic sound. When 
the robot perceives an object or action, activation spreads from 
the internal units of NoL to the internal units of L, which causes 
the robot to produce the sound which in its experience co-varies 
with that object or action. In other words, the robot is able to both 
produce and understand language.
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about brain and behavior that involve the other half of the mind. 
(For some attempts at simulating the brain involved in emo-
tions, see Rolls and Treves, 1998; Rolls, 1999; Avila-Garcia and 
Canamero, 2004.) Furthermore, we have said that current “emo-
tional robots” do not actually have emotions because emotions 
do not play any clearly identifiable functional or adaptive role in 
their behavior, but the results obtained with our robotic mod-
els should be compared with those of alternative models, both 
robotic and non-robotic. An important test of the models will 
be their ability to reproduce not only the results of experiments 
but also other empirical facts such as inter-individual differences 
in the emotional half of the mind, i.e., differences in personality 
and character rather than in cognitive ability, the pathologies of 
the emotional half of the mind, i.e., psychiatric and psychologi-
cal disturbances rather than neurological ones (Stein and Ludik, 
2008), and the expression of the emotional half of the mind in 
the production and appreciation of works of art.
social motivations. The other link between emotions and sociality 
is the expression of emotions. The emotional circuit allows the 
brain (neural network) to interact not only with what is inside the 
body but also with the external body, causing postures and move-
ments of some parts of the body (especially the face) that can be 
perceived by other robots. We have advanced the hypothesis that 
this expression of emotions has two adaptive advantages: it allows 
a robot that expresses its emotions to manipulate the behavior of 
other robots that perceive the expressed emotions and it allows the 
robot which perceives the emotions expressed by another robot to 
predict and anticipate the behavior of the other robot. Finally, we 
have briefly discussed which type of neural network should control 
the behavior of robots that have language and how words can have 
both cognitive and emotional meanings for a robot.
The robotic models we have described are very simple and 
very tentative and one still has to show that they are able to 
explain (reproduce) the constantly accumulating empirical facts 
Parisi The other half of the embodied mind
www.frontiersin.org May 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 7
mercial or financial relationships that 
could be construed as a potential conflict 
of interest.
Received: 15 August 2010; accepted: 04 
April 2011; published online: 02 May 
2011.
Citation: Parisi D (2011) The other half of 
the embodied mind. Front. Psychology 2:69. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00069
This article was submitted to Frontiers 
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Parisi. This is an open-
access article subject to a non-exclusive 
license between the authors and Frontiers 
Media SA, which permits use, distribution 
and reproduction in other forums, provided 
the original authors and source are credited 
and other Frontiers conditions are complied 
with.
Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Robinson, P., and el Kaliouby, R. 
(2009). Computations of  emo-
tions in man and machines. Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 
3441–3447.
Rolls, E. T. (1999). The Brain and 
Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Rolls, E. T., and Treves, A. (1998). Neural 
Networks and Brain Function. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Ruini, F., Petrosino, G., Saglimbeni, F., and 
Parisi, D. (2010). “The strategic level 
and the tactical level of behaviour,” in 
Advances in Cognitive Systems, eds J. 
Gray and S. Nefti-Meziani (Herts: IET 
Publisher), 271–299.
Seth, A. K. (1998). “Evolving action selec-
tion and selective attention without 
action, attention, or selection,” in 
Proceedings of the 5th Conference on 
the Simulation of Adaptive Behaviour, 
eds R. Pfeifer, B. Blumberg, J-A. Meyer, 
and S. Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press).
Seth, A. K. (2007). The ecology of action 
selection: insights from artificial life. 
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 
362, 1545–1558.
Stein, D. J., and Ludik, J. (eds). (2008). 
Neural Networks and Psychopathology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Ziemke, T. (2008). On the role of emotion 
in biological and robotic autonomy. 
Biosystems 91, 410–408.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
author declares that the research was 
conducted in the absence of any com-
Chella and R. Mazzotti (Thorverton: 
Imprinting Academic), 191–211.
Parisi, D. (2010). Robots with language. 
Front. Neuorobot. 4:10. doi: 10.3389/
fnbot.2010.00010.
Parisi, D., and Petrosino, G. (2010). Robots 
that have emotions. Adapt. Behav. 18, 
453–469.
Picard, R. W. (2000). Affective Computing. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Picard, R. W. (2003). “What does it 
mean for a computer to “have” 
emotions?” in Emotions in Humans 
and Artifacts, eds R. Trappl, P. Petta, 
and S. Payr (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), 87–102.
Rizzolatti, G., and Craighero, L. (2004). 
The mirror-neuron system. Annu. Rev. 
Neurosci. 27, 169–192.
Robbins, P., and Aydede, M. (2009). The 
Cambridge Handbook of Situated 
Parisi The other half of the embodied mind
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  May 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 8
